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Summary finclings
The recent restructuring of Latin American economies  any other. Instead, in Argentina men have overtaken
has renewed interest in the effects of trade liberalization  women as the most prevalent workers in the informal
on labor markets ar.d on the gender division of labor.  wage sector, while in Brazil the opposite has occurred (as
Cunningham does not attempt to establish causality  men move into self-employment). In Costa Rica there
between economic reforms and the types of jobs that  have been no statistically observable changes.
men and women hold. Instead, she provides a detailed  The author then considers the distribution across
description of the trends in male and female formal and  sectors within each gender group to identify whether
informal sector participation during the economic reform  men and women are more likely to select different
period in Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica.  sectors in the post-reform period relative to the pre-
Cunningham first compares the gender composition of  reform period. Among both men and women in all three
the formal, informal wage, and self-employment sectors  countries (except Brazilian men), workers have become
in a year before reforms (1988 for Argentina, 1989 for  more likely to hold informal wage jobs and less likely to
Brazil and Costa Rica) and a year after reforms (1997 for  hold formal sector jobs. Trends in human capital
Argentina, 1995 for Brazil and Costa Rica). Although  accumulation explain these changes for both men and
women continued  to be more likely than men to work in  women, while changes in gender roles, primarily in
the informal wage sector, there is no trend of  homecare and marriage, do not seem to have an effect.
masculinization or feminization of the informal sector or
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The World  BankI.  Introduction
Over the past decade, most Latin American countries instituted structural reforms
that included privatization, market-based  exchange  rate policies, and lower trade barriers,
thus exposing their economies to world market forces that had not been experienced since
the early part of the century. The ramifications of liberalization on labor markets are not
well understood (Leamer,  Robbins 1997, Wood 1994),  but the gender dimensions are
even less documented.  '  This paper does not attempt to establish a causality between the
economic restructuring and the gender balance of labor markets. 2 Instead, it is a
description of the gender composition of the labor market before and after periods of
economic reforms. We examine whether or not the types ofjobs that women hold has
changed in three countries characterized  by varying degrees  of structural reforms and
labor market rigidities over the period 1988-1997: Argentina with rapid opening product
markets and strong unions that keep labor markets rigid, Brazil with a similar
restructuring but more flexible labor markets, and Costa Rica with its flexible labor
markets and modest reforms. 3
Labor markets in developing countries are assumed to be composed of at least two
subsectors: an informal and formal sector (Hart 1973, Thomas 1992). The former is
composed of workers who do not enjoy the work conditions and benefits that are
mandated by labor laws. There is a great deal of discussion in both academic and policy
circles regarding the causes for and the implications of the various sectors. Mainstream
thought claims that the dual sectors exist due to labor market segmentation  such that
formal sector  jobs are the preferred jobs and residual workers create inferior employment
to absorb the excess labor (Thomas 1992, Burki 1998, Stiglitz 1974). Under this theory,
policymakers  strive to abolish the non-formal  jobs.  However,  the original work that
identified multiple sectors (Hart 1973)  as well as recent work suggest that labor markets
are well integrated and cite the positive attributes of higher mean wages, flexibility, and
freedoms found in self-employment  or apprenticeships  via the informal sector (Maloney
1998, 1999; Cunningham 1999) that would induce individuals to select these jobs over
those in the formal sector. Those who subscribe to this view do not aim to abolish the
sector but rather to protect it while integrating some of its positive attributes into the
formal sector. Due to the unresolved debate on a quality ranking of the various sectors,
we will not impose a priori a ranking. Instead, we will confine the analysis to the
descriptive  to allow practitioners of both views to utilize the results.  We will examine
three sectors: the formal sector employees, composed of workers who pay into the social
l Exceptions include Black and Brainerd 1999,  Barrientos and Barrientos 1996, Gammage 1999
2 The variety of macroeconomic  changes and the econometric  challenges associated with measuring causal
relationships between economy-wide  policy changes and observed outcomes make it quite difficult to
identify the impacts  of one policy change (such as trade liberalization, exchange  rate reforms, etc.) on the
gender balance in the labor market. For a discussion  of the challenges of economy-wide impact evaluation,
see (Baker 2000)
3Saavedra  (2000) and Arias (2000) examine the changes in wages over the same period in the Argentina,
Costa Rica, and Brazil for women and men, respectively.
2security system; informal sector employees,  who do not pay into social security and work
in firms wilh six or less employees;  and the self-employed. 4
Theory does not help us predict how, if at all, economic reforms will affect the
allocation of male and female workers across  these three sectors. For those who believe
that the informal sector consists of unskilled  jobs and the formal sector are only skilled
jobs, trade liberalization should lead to a feminization  of the informal sector since
women, on average, have fewer job market skills than men do. 5 However, Robbins'
(1997) statistical work shows that in Chile, the wages of skilled workers increased during
liberalization due to the adoption of skill-intensive  technology. Since many skilled
workers also work in the informal sector,  theories based on skill levels cannot be used to
sort out expected allocation patterns. Due to a lack of consensus in the theory, we will
proceed without theory to search for trends of a feminization  of any one sector.
We will define feminization  in two ways. First, it may be a change in the sectoral
gender balance such that women's share ofjobs in a particular sector, relative to men's,
has increased. Secondly, feminization may be interpreted as an increased share of women
in a particular sector relative to women in the other sectors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the structural reform
process in each country. Section III describes  the data and variables that will be used in
the formal analysis. The fourth section briefly compares the mean characteristics  of the
labor force between countries and between  years.  Section V reviews the method of the
analysis. Section six tests for a shift in the gender composition of the informal sector, by
1) comparing unconditional sectoral allocation patterns in earlier and later years and 2)
formally estimating a sectoral choice multinomial logit model for each year to compare
the sign and magnitude of the gender dummy. Section seven examines the intra-gender
sectoral shifts by comparing raw sectoral allocation proportions. The supply-side reasons
behind these changes are revealed in sectoral choice models. Finally we conclude.
II.  Countries
Three  countries are analyzed: Argentina, Brazil, and Costa Rica. They were
selected based on the diversity of their liberalization experiences, the flexibility of their
labor markets, and data availability. For each country,  we select a sample year in the late
1980s  and one in the mid-1990s, such that the economy is at the same point in the
business cycle in each sample year (about 3% growth rate of GDP).  Since only two years
4 The infonnal  sector  is composed  of informal  wage  employees,  self-employed,  firm  owners,  unpaid
workers,  and  family  workers.  The first  two  subsectors  are the largest,  consisting  of approximately  10%  and
30% of the labor  force,  respectively,  while  the other  sectors  are, collectively,  5-7%  of the labor  force.
Given  the small  sample  size of the latter  three  sectors,  they  will  not be analyzed.  Often,  the informal  wage
and self-employment  sectors  are treated  as single  "informal  sector"  but research  has  shown  that  they  are too
distinct  to Ireat  together  (Maloney  1999).
5 The Heckscher-Ohlin  Theory hypothesizes  that free trade causes an increase in demand for (goods
produced by) the abundant factor in each country. Since the informal sector is often equated with excess
unskilled labor, and women have, on average, lower average education levels and less  job market
experience than men, the demand for (and remuneration in) these jobs should increase as a result of
liberalization, making it attractive to women who otherwise may remain out of the labor force.
3were analyzed, we are not claiming that the results are indicative of a new trend. Instead,
they only show allocations in a post-reform year relative to a pre-reform year .6
2.1  Argentina
Argentina is a case of a rapidly liberalizing economy  that remains relatively
inflexible due to its fixed nominal exchange rate and strong unions that inhibit job growth
and lead to high unemployment. 7 In the late 1980s,  the Argentine economy was suffering
from high inflation, highly  variable growth rates, and a somewhat closed economy. With
the 1991 convertibility plan, inflation  fell to the single digits, privatization began, and
structural adjustments included fiscal, public sector, trade, and financial sector reforms.
Tariffs fell by nearly half (28% to 15%), 51 firms were privatized over the period 1989-
1991, and public employment fell by 75%.
The effects on the labor market (Pessino 1997) included 1) an increase in the price
of labor relative to capital due to the elimination of tariffs on capital goods and the real
appreciation of the peso, 2) an increase in unemployment  and underemployment, 3) an
increase in female labor force participation,  4) technological  change that increased the
demand for skilled labor, and 5) slowly increasing  productivity.
2.2  Brazil
Brazil presents a case of a rapidly liberalizing economy  with a somewhat flexible
exchange rate policy (managed float rather than a peg) and a relatively flexible labor
market.  Three events most profoundly defined the economic restructuring in the 1990s.
First, hyper-inflation  was brought under control by the Real Plan in July 1994 via a new
currency (the real), tight monetary policy, government support of the currency, and
elimination of price and wage indexation (Franco 1996). Secondly, Brazil changed its
economic plan to an outward looking economy by cutting its tariffs in half and therefore
forcing firms to cut their labor force in an effort to increase productivity and trim costs to
stay competitive. Finally, a privatization  program was initiated such that by October
1992, twenty-two state firms were privatized (Baer 1995).
The labor market's  response to these changes were as expected.  Real wages
increased for workers in all sectors as the value of the real increased (Wilkie 1995) and
productivity in  the  formal  sector increased rapidly  (Ministerio de  Trabalho  1997).
Increased aggregate demand was answered through increased employment, especially in
the self-employment sector but employment in the manufacturing sector fell in favor of
increased productivity (Amadeo 1996).
6 The exception is Argentina where the early period is a recessionary period and the latter is an expansion.
These periods are robust to labor market shifts, though, as wages and unem!9yment behavior was similar
between the two periods.
7It  may be argued that excessive labor legislation  is the cause behind the high unemployment  rates.
However, Argentina's legislation  is not particularly more rigid than that of most countries in Latin America
(Marquez 1994),  Brazil for example, that have much lower unemployment  rates.
42.3  Costla  Rica
Costa Rica did not experience the prolonged,  severe economic difficulties of
Brazil and Atrgentina  since it rapidly repositioned itself after the 1983 debt crisis and has
been on a steady growth path since (except for 1995). Thus, massive economic reforms
in the late 1980s were not necessary. The average degree of tariff protection fell by 16%
in the period 1985-1994  and exports of nontraditional goods were promoted via tax
incentives and import duty exemptions, but in 1995,  tariffs were increased to meet the
growing interest demands from the public debt that rapidly escalated during the election
cycle (1993-4). Free trade zones and maquilas were introduced in 1990 and became a
significant portion of export earnings in 1993  with the entrance of Intel Corporation and
its improved technology and productivity  processes. There was gradual privatization and
public sector downsizing in the mid-  I 990s, but the process was slow due to union
opposition and political roadblocks (Cespedes and Jimenez 1994).
The labor market has been stable over the period with low unemployment and
favorable income distribution. Maquila employment  has become very important as
public sector employment  is decreasing. The labor laws remain largely unchanged over
the period as well. Thus, Costa Rica may be considered  the "base case" against which to
consider the sectoral allocation changes experienced in the rapidly reforming economies.
III.  Data
The data sets are cross-sectional household surveys from the late 1980s and mid-
1  990s.8 A pre-reform and post-reform period are selected  for each country. For the
Argentine analysis, the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) in 1988 and 1997 is
used.  The Brazilian Pesquisa Nacional de Amostra de Domicilio and the Costa Rican
Encuesta de Hogares de Prop6sitos Multiples (EHPM) are used for 1989 and 1995. To
keep the samples relatively comparable across countries, only individuals who are
between the ages of 15 and 70, work for remuneration, are wage employees or self-
employed, and reside in urban areas 9 are analyzed.
The sectors are defined according to self-reporting and access to federally
mandated benefits. The self-employed  are those who identify themselves as
"cuenta/conta propia", regardless of their earnings or access to government benefits.
Fornal  sector workers define themselves as employees and either work in firns  where
the employer pays for their benefits (social security or job insurance) or work in firms
with more than 6 employees. Informal sector workers are those who define themselves as
employees, work a positive number of hours in exchange for remuneration, work in firms
with six employees or less, and do not receive social security benefits from their
employers.
8  The countries and years were selected based on data availability,  liberalization pattern, the business cycle
and questions  that allow us to identify the informal sector.
9  Only observations  in the Greater Buenos Aires area are considered in the Argentina analysis. The Costa
Rican sample includes anyone who declares his/her area as "urban", and the Brazilian sample only includes
those individuals in the states of Recife, Bahia, Ceara, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo, and Parand who identify
themselves as non-agricultural  workers.
5IV.  Stylized Facts
Table 1 shows that in the late 1  980s, men are nearly twice as likely as women to
participate in the labor force.'° Among men and women who work for pay, men are more
likely than women to be in the self-employment  or formal wage sectors while the reverse
is true for the informal sector. Relative  to 1988/9  proportions, we are interested in
establishing evidence on 1) whether or not women's (men's) likelihood of entering any
particular sector, relative to the other sectors, was higher in the 1  990s and 2) whether or
not women's share of employment  in any one sector, relative to men, has changed.
To focus the analysis on sectoral allocation trends in the formal, informal wage,
and self-employment sectors, we consider only the sample of the remunerated
economically  active population. Table 1 shows that a disproportionate  number of paid
working women entered the informal salaried sector in Argentina and Brazil. In
Argentina, there are 2.4% more in the latter period while in Brazil, the proportion grow
by 4.58%. These increases are counterbalanced  by a decrease in female formal sector
employment. Therefore, a first glance suggests that women in the economies with the
most reforms are more likely to be in the informal salaried sector than the other sectors,
relative to the earlier period, while in the slowly reforming Costa Rica, any changes
women's patterns are not statistically  evident.
However, men's sectoral allocation  proportions also change over the period.
Argentine and Costa Rican men are more likely to be in the informal salaried sector in the
latter periods than in the former and their respective  rates of increase (4.58% and 2.07%)
exceed those of women (2.41% and 0%). However, men still remain less likely to be
informally  employed than their female counterparts. Additionally, men's likelihood of
formal sector employment  decreases more than women's likelihoods in the two countries.
An opposite pattern emerges in Brazil where men's informal wage attachment decreases
while their formal sector attachment falls more slowly than women's.  Instead, Brazilian
men's attachment to self-employment  increases.
To identify if women's share of a sector,  relative to men's, increases between the
two periods, Table I shows the proportion of female remunerated workers relative to all
remunerated workers in sector  j in 1988/9  and 1995/7. A difference between the ratios is
due to a change in the gender "structure" of the labor market.  We find that women's
share of the labor force increases in all three countries, reflecting higher increases in their
labor force participation rates in the latter period as compared to the men's trends. With
respect to the sectors, there is a general trend for increased female presence in the formal
sector (the change is not significant in Costa Rica, though) and a feminization of the
informal sector in Brazil but a masculinization  of it in Argentina.
10  Table I shows that female participation in the labor force increased in all three countries. In Argentina,
40% of the women between the ages of 15-70 either worked or searched for  jobs, but nearly 50% did so by
1997. Over the period 1989-1995 in Argentina  and Costa Rica, participation increased from 46.0% to
50.6% and 52.4%, respectively. Men's labor force participation followed a less dramatic upward trend in
Argentina and Costa Rica, but it fell in Brazil.
6Thus, as women's paid employment  increases, in the liberalizing economies, men
are less likely to be in formal sector  jobs relative to themselves in 1988/9 and relative to
women in 1995/7. Furthermore,  informal sector employment  increases within gender
(except among Brazilian  males), but across gender, there is a masculinization of the
informal wage sector in Argentina and a femininization  in Brazil. Allocation  rates, both
within and across gender, do not change for the self-employment  sector (except for
increased self-employment among Brazilian males) nor for the stable Costa Rican
economy. However, the changes in sectoral allocation patterns perhaps are not due to
gender but rather due to other characteristics  that are correlated with gender. To identify
whether or not the reallocations are a gender issue, we must control for human capital,
household structure, wealth and other income resources, and demand side factors.
V.  Modeling Approach
5.1  Modeling Approach
We would like to determine 1) if the intra-sectoral gender balance in the informal
sector is changing, 2) if there is an intra-gender  shift in sectoral allocation, and 3) the
cause of the change in sectoral allocation patterns of women and men. The analysis
proceeds in three parts. The first identifies  whether or not the gender balance in the
informal sector changes. We estimate a multinomial logit model to control for
characteristics that may be correlated with a gender but are causing the observed sectoral
reallocations.1 1 The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the values of 1, 2, or 3,
respectively, for participation in the self-employed,  informal wage or formal sector and a
gender dummy is included. The model is estimated for the whole labor force in the pre-
and post-reform years and the coefficients  on the gender dummies are compared to
identify if similar patterns emerge among the three sample countries.
Second, we identify if there is a shift toward any one sector within gender. We
estimate the econometric model described above for a sample of remunerated women and
separately  for a sample of remunerated  working men to identify those factors that are
most correlated with sectoral re-distributions. These are specific factors that are useful to
understand the types of people in each sector and potential target variables for affecting
the sectoral allocation.
Finally, we examine whether the change in sectoral allocation patterns are due to a
change in the mean characteristics  of the labor force or a change in the role of certain
characteristics in sorting individuals into a particular sector. We estimate the
l  Sectoral allocations may be interpreted as the observed outcome of a two-step process: the decision to
work and the decision to be in a sector. Thus, the coefficient  estimates from a sectoral allocation model will
be biased. A common means to control for selectivity  bias is to use a Heckman two-step procedure where
the first step is the selection model. The results from the selectivity model are presented in Appendix 1.
However, they do not well explain the labor force participation choice, so econometrically,  it is preferable
to not use the two-step process but rather estimate the second model directly and take into account the
selectivity bias in the interpretation of the results (Heckman 1979).
7probabilities of being in each sector  in each year' 2 and compare it to the probabilities  if
we allow only the means to differ  between years (hold the coefficient estimates equal)
and the probabilities if we only allow only the coefficients  to differ (hold constant the
means across years). This gives us insights into whether  the changed probabilities
between the two years is due to a change in labor  force characteristics  or due to the
sorting power of supply side variables.
5.2  Variables
The variables that identify  the likelihood  of being in one sector over another are
broken into five general categories: gender,  human capital (experience,  education),
household structure (marital  status, headship,  number of individuals in the household by
age), resources (household  wealth and income), and other (race and region in Brazil,
region in Costa Rica). Mostly supply  side variables  are used due to an absence of
demand side variables in the data sets. The only exception  is regional dummies for the
Brazilian and Costa Rican models. The variables  in each category are as follows:
5.2.1  Gender
This variable captures those unobservable  preferences  and constraints  associated
with being male or female that induce individuals  to be in any particular sector.
5.2.2  Human capital
Experience: true experience  is difficult to measure, so age is used as a proxy. A
quadratic  is also included. Previous  research has found that experienced  women tend to
be in the formal sector  and experienced  men tend toward formal or self-employment
sectors since these give the highest rewards  for experience  (Maloney 1998,  Cunningham
1998).
Education: dummies are used, each taking a value of 1 if that category is the
highest level of education  the individual  reached. The categories  are incomplete primary
(including no school), incomplete secondary,  complete  secondary  (including incomplete
college),  and complete  college (including  graduate school). The omitted category is
completed  primary. 13 Along the lines of other research,  we expect that the more educated
are more likely to go into the forrnal  sector,  a sector that assigns  jobs and pay based on
12 We would iike to do a type of Oaxaca decomposition  but cannot  because we are 1) predicting  multiple
states (formal  wage, informal  wage, self-employment)  and 2) predicting  relative probabilities. Instead, we
will calculate  the relative risk ratios and the means values  of the variables for each state and identify
whether  or not the mean values are changing  relative to the base group and/or the relative risk ratios differ
between periods.
13 For the Brazilian  models, the incomplete  primary variable is broken into three dummies  to take into
consideration  the two levels of primary school: incomplete  primary I (grades 1-4), incomplete  primary 2
(grades 5-8), and complete  primary 2.  The omitted  variable is incomplete  primary 1. Secondary is 9-11
and  "grade" 12 is technical school or "vestibular",  the year long study  to take the college entrance exams  or
begin technical school
8observable productivity  characteristics  (Cunningham  1998) or into the self-employment
sector, since a more diverse skill set is needed. A dummy  for technical school is also
included as a control.
5.2.3  Household Structure
Time constraints: household composition  is meant to proxy time constraints
imposed by the rest of the household. The number  of young children (age 1-5) and school
aged children.  (age 6-1  1) constrain  women's time and impose demands  on father's income
that should lead to the more flexible self-employment  or informal wage  jobs for women
and the higher paying formal or self-employment  for men. Sectoral allocation due to the
presence of older household  members is less clear, though. Teenaged  daughters  and sons
(age 12-17) could either contribute  to or detract  from mother's time, while they certainly
impose monetary demands  on both parents. Other adults in the household (age 18-65),
less the spouse, may contribute  to the primary female's housework  or they may substitute
for primary -female's/male's  market work.
Marital status and headship:  marital and household head dummies are included to
proxy gender roles and household role.' 4 We expect that household heads and married
men would be more likely to be in the higher  paying sectors (formal or self-employed)
while married women would be in the more flexible sectors in order to fulfill their gender
roles as well as their market roles.
5.2.4  Income and Wealth
Income: These variables measure  household income flows from all sources except
the observation  's own labor income. The income variables are the value of non-labor
income the household receives and the earnings  of all individuals, less the person being
analyzed.1 5 We expect that in households  with higher "other" income, women are in the
most flexible, lower paying self-employment  and infornal wage jobs (Saavedra  2000). A
dummy is included that takes a value of 1 if someone in the household, less the person
being analyzed, receives social security  benefits. This variable is a proxy for access to
public services, i.e. benefits that are already "paid" through a formal sector worker in the
household, thus we would expect those who are in households that already receive these
benefits to be less likely to work in the formal sector where they would "pay twice" for
the services.
Wealth: For Argentina and Brazil, dummies for home ownership, running water
in the home, and rooms per capita are also included as measures of "permanent"  wealth.
The impact is difficult to predict since the data do not permit us to identify if the job lead
to the wealth (high formal wages lead to wealth accumulation)  or if wealth lead to the
sectoral allocation (collateral for the self-employed,  for example).
14 The  Brazilian  survey  does  not  ask  about  marital  status,  so  this  variable  is  omitted  for  the  Brazil  estimates.
15 Due  to inflation  in all  countries  and  various  currencies  in Brazil  throughout  the  period  of  observation,  the
Argentine  peso and the Costa Rican colon have been adjusted to 1988/1989  local currency. The Brazilian
values  have been converted to US$ (based on a daily conversion rate) and inflated  to 1995  currency.
95.2.5  Other
Region:  Since the Argentine sample only covers Greater  Buenos Aires, we cannot
control for differential regional labor markets, but in Brazil and Costa Rica, regional
dummies are included. In Brazil, the two dummies are the poor Northeast (Pernambuco,
Ceara, and Bahia) and the wealthy South (Parana). The omitted region is the wealthy,
industrial Southeast (Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo). The regions in Costa Rica are the
Central Region (less San Jose), Central Pacific, the North, and the poor East (Chorotega
and Brunca). The omitted category is wealthy metropolitan  San Jose.
Race.  Information  on race is only included in the Brazil surveys,  so we cannot
address the issue across the region.  There are two race dummies included in the Brazil
models: black and mulatto. The omitted category is white or "yellow".
5.3  Mean values
The mean values and proportions of the independent  variables for each country
and each year are given in Tables 2a-2c. Mean characteristics  do differ by sector, gender,
and country. The self-employment  sector is the oldest for all countries for men and
women, with a mean age in the range 37-42. Self-employed  men are, on average, two
years older than self-employed  women. Informal wage workers are the youngest with an
average age of 30. Thus, it is not surprising  that the self-employed  (who are older) are
more likely than informal sector men to be married (except in Costa Rica). However,
self-employed  women are more likely than wage women to be married. Since 1/3 of
women have husbands and/or children, this is expected  due to the need to balance gender-
based home and market roles and the flexibility offered  by self-employment  to achieve
the balance more so than in wage jobs.  It follows that women with more children in
Brazil are more likely to be self-employed. In Argentina  and Costa Rica, however,
women with children are the least likely to be self-employed. Perhaps this is due to the
lower dependency  rates and the high number of teenaged daughters  and other adult
females in the households to care for the children. More educated individuals tend to be
in the formal sector (or in self-employment  in Argentina), especially  women. Income,
abstracting  from own earnings,  is lowest among male self-employed  in Argentina and
Brazil but among  informal wage women in all countries. Finally, formal sector workers
are the most likely to have a family member who also is eligible for social security
through his/her  job.  However, 30-40% of men and 40-50% of working women in self-
employment  or informal wage work are eligible for the services provided by the social
security system via another household member.
The shift in household structure and demographics are sector specific differ
between women and men. In Argentina and Brazil, women in the formal sector have
become older,  household heads, and married while men are the opposite. In the other
sectors, both men and women are less likely to be household heads and the women, in
particular, tend to be older than in the earlier sample. The mean values of these variables
do not change  between the survey periods in Costa Rica. In the self-employment  and
10informal wage sectors, the individuals  are more educated  than in earlier years and in
Costa Rica, women's education  seems to be outpacing  men's.  In the formal sector, there
is not a clear shift toward or away from education  level (except for Costa Rica) so as
downsizing occurs, the educated are not necessarily  those who are retained. In fact, they
seem to be increasingly  in the informal wage and self-employment  sectors where wage
growth is highest. As in the sample as a whole, all sectors have fewer children than in the
previous years and in Brazil and Argentina, social security receipt by other family
members has f:allen. With respect to wealth and income, households in all sectors seem
wealthier withL  more rooms per capita and plumbing in the homes. Labor income has
increased across the period for all sectors except in Costa Rica and informal wage women
in Brazil. On the other hand, non-labor  income has fallen in most sectors in Argentina
and Brazil but risen for Costa Ricans (except formal wage women) and the male self-
employed in B3razil.
VI.  Regression Results
6.1  Inter-gender, intra-sectoral  shift: holding sector constant, does the gender
balance chajnge?
The above estimates do not reveal whether  or not the shift in the gender balance of
formal and informal wage sectors is due to a true feminization  (masculinization), i.e. an
increased propensity for women (men) to be in the sector because of their gender, or
whether  the sector is more attractive  to people with certain characteristics  that happen to
be highly correlated with women (men). In this section, we are primarily interested in
understanding  whether or not the gender  balance within sector has changed over the
period of analysis. Tables 2a-2c showed  that women and men who are in the labor force
have very distinct characteristics,  so we should control for these and then ask if being a
female leads to an increased propensity  for informal wage work in Brazil and formal
wage work in Argentina and Brazil.
When controlling  for observable characteristics,  in all three countries, women are
more likely than men to be in the informal wage sector relative to the other sectors (first
row, Tables 3a-3c), as the unconditional observed  proportions in Table 1 showed.
Furthermore, the change in the propensity  for female informal sector attachment mirrors
those changes  noted in Table 1. The first row of Tables 3a-3c show that women's
likelihood  of informal wage work, relative  to men's increases in Brazil but decreases in
Argentina and Costa Rica, reflecting  the trends in Table 1. The change in Argentina and
Costa Rica are due to a higher rate of male entry to the informal wage sector as compared
to women.,  thus increasing the male share of the sector. However, in Brazil, men shift to
self-employment,  leaving informal wage  jobs to the women. Thus, in the two liberalizing
economies (Argentina and Brazil), the informalization  trends moves in opposite
directions for men and women and in the flexible labor markets (Brazil and Costa Rica),
there is not a common trend, implying that liberalization and market flexibility may not
have gender specific impacts.
The trends for the other sectors are not as robust since a difference  in the rates of
change between formal sector and self-employment  attachment cannot be statistically
11identified. The statistics,  though not significant,  do suggest that the likelihood  of formal
sector attachment (relative  to the other sectors) is generally  increasing  among Argentine
and Costa Rican women. The results for Brazilian women are not conclusive.
Other gender  variables change across the region over time as well. Being married
is more associated with self-employment  in Argentina and Costa Rica. In the later period,
the trend is even stronger  for Argentines,  but married Costa Ricans are increasingly
correlated with informnal  wage work. Those with children are more likely to be in the
informal wage or self-employment  sector,  but the trends are weakening  over time.  In
Costa Rica and Argentina,  the presence of children is becoming less of a force in driving
sectoral choice decisions while in Brazil, those with children are less likely to go into the
informal sector than in the earlier  period.
6.2  Intra-gender, inter-sectoral  shift:  in which sectors are women (men) working?
Now we turn to the analysis  of sectoral allocation by gender to identify which
characteristics  are correlated  with attachment  to a certain sector for men and women, if
these differ between men and women, and how they are different in the mid-1990s as
compared to the late 1  980s. The gender-specific  estimated  relative risk ratios for the
propensity  of being in one sector  relative to another are given in Tables  4a-4c. In each
table, a pair of columns  give the likelihood  of being in sector  j rather than sector k in
1988/9 and 1995/7. The coefficient  estimates with a cross are significantly  different from
zero at the 5% level within  the year. An asterisk  indicates that the coefficient estimates
between the years are not equal to each other, at the 5% level. 16
6.2.1  Human Capital
6.2.  1.1 Experience
In all three countries in 1988/9,  older individuals,  i.e. those with more potential
job experience, are the least likely to be informal wage workers,  regardless  of gender.
Furthermore, in Brazil, older men show a propensity  for self-employment  over formal
wage while women do not, despite the means tables statistic  that showed  that, on average,
the self-employment  sector  had the oldest women.
For both men and women, the change in sectoral attachment  of older workers
closely follows the observed proportions in Table 1. Potential experience is correlated
with an increased  propensity  for women to be in the informal sector in the latter period in
Argentina and Brazil. This may be due to the higher  mean wages in this sector for older
workers in the later year (Saavedra 2000). Among men, age is increasingly  associated
16 Given the 6-8 years between observation  periods and the high turnover in the labor markets (see, for
example, Gonzaga 1992 for Brazil), it is not unrealistic  to assume that the pre- and post- reform period
samples are independent,  and thus can be statistically  compared. Although  it may seem counter-intuitive  to
compare coefficients  across years due to different  base individuals,  we have constrained  the base by the
same observable  characteristics  in the two regressions. The unobservables,  of course, cannot be calibrated,
so to the extent that they interact differently  with the observables  in the two years, the differences cannot be
controlled.
12with informal wage jobs in the latter  years in Argentina  and Costa Rica while in Brazil,
experience is more strongly correlated  with self-employment,  thereby supporting the
change in observed proportions. The explanation  may indirectly  be derived from
Cunningham and Maloney  (1998) that showed that there exists a distinct sub-sector of
self-employment  characterized  by older men who were laid off from their previous  jobs
and were unable to find forrnal  sector  work. Extrapolating  to the informal sector, we may
hypothesize that a group of older, less entrepreneurial,  out-of-work  men also turn to the
informal wage sector.  17 Thus, part of the increase  in informal sector employment  may be
attributed to a lower propensity  of some older individuals  to maintain their formal sector
jobs.
6.2.1.2 Education
Disaggregating  by gender, the school dummies show the probability  of being in
sector  j relative to sector k if the individual  has level of education  y rather than completed
primary school (primary 1 for Brazil). In the base year, the more educated are more likely
to be in the formal sector, regardless  of country or gender,  and they tend to be self-
employed rather than informal wage workers. 18
Although individuals with more education  continue to be more likely to be in the
formal sector  job, in the later period, the propensity is declining. In Argentina and Costa
Rica, the propensity  of the more educated to be in formal sector work is gradually
decreasing in favor of informal wage employment  or self-employment,  especially for
those with a university  education. 19 Men and women show opposite  patterns from each
other for participation  in the informal wage sector  relative to self-employment  as
education levels increase, though. The relative propensity  for more educated women to
be in informal wage jobs is decreasing between the periods while the likelihood is
increasing for more educated  men, although  self-employment  remains more likely than
informnal  wage work for educated workers.
Brazilian men show trends similar to men in Argentina and Costa Rica while
Brazilian women are distinct from all groups. The probability  of formal sector attachment
as education levels increase for Brazil men is lower than in the earlier period, and, like
women in the other countries, self-employment  dominates informal wage even more in
the later period for more highly educated  Brazilian men. Conversely,  more educated
Brazilian women are more likely to be in formal sector  jobs than informnal  wage jobs but
their increased  propensity for self-employment  over any wage jobs is their most notable
change over the period, contrary  to Table 1. Nonetheless,  the new trend for the minority
of highly educated  Brazilian women are not strong enough to drive the change in
observed probabilities  reported in Table 1.
" This group was not examined  in Cunningham  and Maloney  (1998).
's In Brazil, the likelihood  of informal rather than self-employment  is not monotonically  decreasing  with
education.
19 For Costa Rican men, we were able to disaggregate  secondary  complete and university complete. For
the most highly educated,  we find the opposite  trend where formal sector work became even more likely,
perhaps due to the influence  of the high technology  maquila industry
13The increasing propensity  for more educated  men to not be in the formal sector
may be due to the increased attractiveness  of the informal sector  due to the increased
relative wages (Arias 2000) or a scarcity  of formal sector  jobs (Cunningham  and Artecona
2000) in an economy with high unemployment  and declining manufacturing  and public
sector employment. Furthermore,  since the general education  level is increasing,  but the
demand in the formnal  sector is not, individuals  with more education  would end up in the
informal sectors.
6.2.2  Household Structure
6.2.2.1 Headship and Marital Status
The base period sectoral allocation probabilities  support the hypotheses that
women balance their home and market responsibilities,  but these trends are not as robust
in the 1990s. In 1988/9,  Argentine and Brazilian female  household heads tend to be in
the self-employment  sector, thereby  allowing  them to fulfill home and market duties 20
while male household heads in all three countries  tend to be in the formal or the self-
employment sector, both of which have median wages that are higher than the median
wage in the informal wage sector (Cunninghamn  and Artecona 2000). In the latter period,
Argentine  female heads increase their likelihood  of self-employment  while Brazilian
women do the opposite,  increasing any wage employment  but still remaining more likely
to be self-employed. Furthermore,  contrary  to the observed proportions, Brazilian  men
who are household heads in the latter period  increasingly  are associated  with informal
sector employment,  though maintaining  their preponderance  for formal or self-
employment, while Argentine  male household heads are more likely to be in the formal
sector.
Although married Argentine  and Costa Rican women are more likely to be self-
employed  rather than wage workers in the early and latter period, allowing them to fulfill
home and work responsibilities,  in the latter  period they are increasingly  foregoing
informal wage work or self-employment  in favor of formal salaried work. This sector has
higher expected earnings  (Cunningham  and Artecona 2000), but is more time
constraining,  thus putting a strain  on women's family and market responsibilities.  The
marriage variable does not enter significantly  for men.
Thus, the change in sectoral attachment  that is correlated  with headship differs
both by gender and by country  while marital status increases formal work for women in
both a non-reforming  (Costa Rica) and liberalizing  (Argentina) economy.
6.2.2.2 Others in the household
20 The  role  of gender  in the choice  to become  self-employed  is discussed  in  Cunningham  (2000).
21 Artecona  and  Cunningham  (2000)  show  that  non-working  women  spend  an average  of 44 hours  each
week on housework  while working women spend  32 hours weekly so their total work burden increases  as
they  enter  the labor  force.
14Although in all three countries,  women and men who have young children
generally do not tend to be in the fornal sector,22  household constraints  are less of a
sorting factor in the later period  than the early, especially  in Argentina  and Costa Rica.
This may be due to a small sample of households  with young children that do not permit
us to sort out these variables. In Brazil, though, with its large sample size, children
remain a factor in sectoral allocation. Brazilian  men and women with young and school-
aged children are increasingly  self-employed  in Brazil. Furthermore,  women with
children are more likely to be in formal rather than informal wage work in the latter
period. Since self-employment  is correlated with higher wages for men and time
flexibility for women, parents seem to be in jobs that allow a better home life for the
children. Witlh  respect to substitutes  to the head's home and market work, the presence of
other adults increases the likelihood  of the head being self-employed,  as households use




Household labor income plays an important  role in women's decisions to be in the
labor force (Appendix I) but it also is relevant  in sectoral allocation, more so than for
men. In Argentine  and Brazilian  households with more income,  women and men tend to
be in the self-employment  sector in 1988/9, and this tendency is stronger in 1995/7.
Since credit for starting and maintaining a firm is principally obtained from personal or
infornal sources (Cunningham  and Maloney 1998),  the greater abundance of income
(Tables 2a-2c)  may increase the dependence  on this source of financing in the more
volatile economies of the 1990s.
Non-labor income has a similar correlation  with self-employment  as does labor
income in Brazil, but not in Argentina. In Argentina, higher non-labor is associated with
men's informal wage work in 1988/9, but it loses its sorting power afterwards, perhaps
due the decreased value of this income among informal wage workers (Table 2a) and thus
the lower dependency  on it. In Brazil, on the other hand, it followed the same pattern as
wage labor: high correlation  with self-employment  that becomes even stronger in the
later for both men and women.
Access to social security benefits is correlated with formal sector employment in
both periods, but less so in the latter period, for both men and women in Argentina and
Brazil. The correlation is likely due to networks: individuals who are fornal sector
workers will provide access to that sector to others in his/her household. However, the
movemenit  toward non-formal  jobs may reflect a more efficient allocation of household
resources such  that if the household is eligible for benefits via one person's formal work
status, other individuals will work in non-formal  jobs that are not subject to the tax.
Costa Rican men show the same trend with respect to self-employment  relative to formal
22 This is principally picked up in the labor force participation  entry decision, not the sectoral choice
(Appendix 1).
15wage work, despite the increased  likelihood  of social security  benefits in their
households.
6.2.3.2 Wealth 23
Wealth, proxied by household  characteristics,  is weakly significant  both in terms
of the variables and trends across the countries. Asset ownership  is correlated  with self-
employment in the early period and even more so in the later period, especially among
Argentine and Brazilian men. Jovanovic  (1989) would attribute this to the use of wealth
as collateral  for formal credit, but higher  mean self-employment  earnings (Arias 2000,
Saavedra  2000) may simply lead to asset ownership. However, amenities that cannot be
used as collateral  but can be purchased  with income,  such as running water, are correlated
with more participation  in the formal sector,  not self-employment  for men and women,
suggesting that the collateral  precedes  the self-employment  wealth.
6.  2.4.  Other
6.2.4.1 Race
The race variable has very different implications  for Brazilian men and women.
Race has a higher weight for women than men, so it is relatively  effective target variable
for women. In both periods, black or mulatto  working men and women are the least
likely to be in self-employment, 24 but their propensity  for fornal relative to informal
wage is not statistically  evident (except for black women who tend toward informal wage
jobs). After the reforms, the tendency  to not be self-employed  increases for women, but
men's tendency for self-employment  increases for all except mulatto men whose
likelihood  of informal wage, relative to self-employment,  increases. Furthermore,  the
distinction  between formal and informal wage decreases  even more.
6.2.4.2 Region
Despite the many impacts of the reform process in the Southeastern  region of
Brazil and the expansion  of the maquila sector in the San Jose region in Costa Rica,
sectoral allocations do not change  very much. Workers in the Brazilian northeast and
Costa Rican Brunca and Chorotega  regions, the poorest in each country,  are more likely
to be in self-employment  or informal  wage jobs, relative to the wealthiest regions. In the
later period, the propensity for self-employment  in the Brazilian  northeast increases for
women while wage work increases for men, and self-employment  or formal work
probabilities  improve for Costa Rican men. Thus, for the poor regions, the changes  over
23 These variables are not included in the Costa Rican survey.
24 Becker (1971) would attribute this to a higher perceived  level of consumer  rather than employer
discrimination. Consumers (creditors)  who are prejudiced against non-whites are less likely  to buy from
businesses  owned  by non-whites so the expected  profits in the non-white  businesses are low. If non-white
workers  believe that these wages are lower than those from salaried work, they will not select self-
employment.
16time are not gender or country  specific;  Brazilian  women and Costa Rican men increase
their self-employment  propensity  relative to the rich regions while Brazilian  men in the
poor regions are,  more likely to be in wage work. Brazilian men's trends may reflect a
decline in wage jobs in the wealthier  region or an increase in opportunities in the poor
regions, but the former is more likely (Mercado  de Trabalho 1997). In the other regions,
there is less of a difference  between  periods, as the sectoral  allocations are not
significantly  different from the wealthy  regions in the latter period. Thus, there is a
convergence  of labor market structures  in the middle and upper income regions, while the
poor regions remain distinct.
6.3  Change in sectoral  allocation patterns: labor force characteristics  or
explanatory variables?
Tables 2a-2c show that the characteristics  of the labor force are changing while
tables 4a-4c show that the weights attributed  to these characteristics  are changing. The
results of both set of tables do not perfectly  reflect the observed probabilities from Table
1. Thus, to identify whether  the changing characteristics  of the labor force or the
changing returns to certain characteristics  are more responsible  for the observed changes,
we dissect the observed probabilities  into changes due to the mean characteristics  and
those due to the weights. Table 5 consists of three panels, one for each country. In the
top section of each panel, multinomial  logit estimates and mean values are used to
generate pre(licted  probabilities. 25, In the lower left sections of each panel, we test
whether or not the observed proportion  differentials are due to a change in the
composition of the labor force by allowing  the mean characteristics  to change while
holding constant  the estimated  parameters. The bottom right section  tests whether or not
the differentials are due to a change in the estimated parameters  by calculating  the
predicted probabilities if the mean characteristics  remained  unchanged between the years,
but only the probability  weights of the characteristics  are permitted to vary. 26
The bottom left section of each panel in Table 5 shows that if the characteristics
of workers remained  constant between the periods, the sectoral allocations would not
change in Argentina  and Costa Rica and would be counter to Table I for Brazil. In
particular, the mean characteristics  of the Brazilian labor force in 1995 would decrease
the likelihood of informal wage employment  and increase that of formal sector workers.
Self-employment  among men would be less likely while women's self-employment  in all
three countries does change enough such that the expected sectoral allocation should
change. Thus, the new patterns  must be due to changes in the weights of characteristics.
Holding constant the mean characteristics  of the early period, the bottom right
section of each panel in Table 4 supports  the patterns found when both the means and
returns differ. Formal sector employment  decreases in Brazil and Argentina but remains
25 The  observed  and  predicted  sectoral  allocations  are very  similar  and show  nearly  identical  patterns
26 The  predicted  probabilities  were  generated  for  comparison  purposes  since  the estimated  proportions  when
means  or parameters  are held  constant,  will  not capture  the unobservables  that  may  be driving  the observed
proportions.  For  the latter  exercise  to  be meaningful,  we  should  compare  it to proportions  that  allow  both
means  and  parameters  to change,  but omit  the  unobservables.
17unchanged in Costa Rica as the measured  proportions also showed. Furtherrnore,
informal wage employment  increases  for all workers,  although  Argentine and Costa
Rican women do not have a difference  in proportions in the original calculations.
Contrary  to the expected probabilities  when parameters  are held constant and means
change, Brazilian men increase their likelihood  of self-employment  and women decrease
their attachment. Thus, the market forces that determine sectoral choice are the primary
impetus behind differing sectoral allocation  patterns, not the changing  face of the labor
force.
VI.  Conclusion
The gender composition of the labor market has changed in the past decade.
Formal sector attachment  has decreased and informal  wage sector attachment has
increased for nearly all men and women, relative to remunerated  workers within gender,
in the three sample countries. However, the change in the gender balance within sector
does differ among the three countries. In Argentina  there has been a masculinization of
the infornal sector such that men now dominate  the sector  while in Brazil there is a
feminization.
The supply side explanatory  variables suggest  that the relevance of the variables,
not the composition of the labor force is contributing  to the changing  proportions, i.e.
certain characteristics  play a larger (or smaller) roles in explaining sectoral attachments
than in the earlier periods.  The changes in the composition of the labor force are largely
counter to the direction  of change of the observed sectoral  attachment probabilities.
Observable  human capital variables are generally  good predictors for the change
in the observed probabilities. Higher levels of education  and experience are less
correlated with formal sector  attachment  than in 1988/9. However, education has less
predictive power than in the earlier period  and its sorting effects on informal jobs (self- or
informal wage employment)  differ between gender and country. Therefore, it appears
that human capital is less a guarantor of formal sector  jobs compared  to the earlier
periods.  This may be due to increased  job opportunities and higher wage growth in the
informal sectors (Arias 2000, Saavedra  2000) or due to fewerjob opportunities in the
newly competitive,  large (and therefore formal) firms.
Gender variables, proxied by household composition,  do not well explain the
change in the observed probabilities. First, the change  in the sectoral allocation patterns
between periods are not uniform by gender  or by country. Second, many of these
variables are associated with an increase in self-employment,  especially for women,
although self-employment  participation rates generally  did not change in the observed
probabilities. Thus, gender characteristics  remain secondary  to human capital in the
choice behind sectoral allocation patterns.
18VIII.  Graphs and Tables
TABLE 1: Observed sectoral attachment  probabilities
A. Argentina
1988  1997
male  female  female!  male  female  female!
all  all
LFP  0.774  0.389  0.37  0.833*  0.493*  0.389*
s-e  0.274  0.253  0.351  0.266  0.252  0.36
informal wage  0.107  0.198  0.52  0.153*  0.222*  0.473*
formal  0.618  0.549  0.342  0.581*  0.536  0.363*
B. Brazil
1989  1995
male  female  female!  male  female  female!
all  all
LFP  0.892  0.461  0.369  0.824*  0.506*  0.426*
s-e  0.233  0.229  0.366  0.268* 0.222  0.376
infornal wage  0.184  0.227  0.421  0.160*  0.284*  0.562*
formal  0.583  0.545  0.354  0.571*  0.494*  0.386*
C. Costa Rica
1989  1995
male  female  female!  male  female  female!
all  all
ILF  0.843  0.460  0.377  0.862*  0.524*  0.40*
s-e  0.210  0.168  0.33  0.185*  0.151  0.345
informal wage  0.099  0.181  0.530  0.120*  0.187  0.503
formal  0.690  0.651  0.368  0.695  0.662  0.381
* the difference  in proportions between the two years is significantly  different from 0 at
the 5% level
19TABLE 2A:  ARGENTINA - Mean Values of Explanatory Variables
Male  Female
all  s-e  informal  formal  all  s-e  Informal  formal
Human capital
age  38.48  42.39  32.88  37.81  36.61  41.18  36.21  34.89
38.04  42.71  33.78  37.06*  38.13*  42.77*  37.43  36.42*
Incomplete  primary  0.13  0.14  0.14  0.13  0.11  0.18  0.26  0.04
0.08*  0.12  0.09*  0.07*  0.07*  0.12*  0.15*  0.02*
Complete primary  0.34  0.34  0.42  0.33  0.26  0.36  0.39  0.18
0.30*  0.34  0.36*  0.27*  0.22*  0.30*  0.34  0.14*
Incomplete  secondary  0.22  0.22  0.24  0.21  0.16  0.14  0.18  0.16
0.24*  0.22  0.30*  0.23  0.16  0.17  0.22  0.13*
Complete secondary  0.13  0.14  0.08  0.14  0.20  0.11  0.07  0.27
0.17*  0.14  0.12*  0.20*  0.18  0.14  0.14*  0.22*
Complete university  0.07  0.09  0.01  0.08  0.15  0.14  0.03  0.20
0.09*  0.10  0.03  0.10*  0.21*  0.18  0.05  0.28*
Technical school  0.14  0.15  0.12  0.15  0.03  0.02  0.02  0.04
0.14  0.15  0.13  0.14  0.02  0.02  0.03  0.02*
Household  structure
Married  0.72  0.80  0.51  0.72  0.51  0.65  0.51  0.45
0.66*  0.74*  0.47  0.67*  0.51  0.66  0.48  0.46
Hh head  0.74  0.85  0.52  0.72  0.65  0.82  0.64  0.59
0.68*  0.77*  0.48  0.69*  0.67  0.84  0.62  0.62
# children age 1-5  0.31  0.30  0.30  0.32  0.20  0.22  0.22  0.18
0.25*  0.24*  0.22*  0.27*  0.17*  0.20  0.20  0.14
# children age 6-11  0.47  0.48  0.39  0.47  0.34  0.39  0.49  0.27
0.35*  0.36*  0.31*  0.35*  0.28*  0.32  0.35*  0.23*
# daughters 12-17  0.20  0.22  0.18  0.20  0.21  0.27  0.27  0.16
0.18*  0.14*  0.23  0.19  0.17*  0.20*  0.21*  0.15
# sons age 12-17  0.21  0.18  0.26  0.22  0.19  0.19  0.29  0.150.23  0.22*  0.26  0.22  0.18  0.23  0.25  0.13
# other adult women  0.38  0.36  0.44  0.38  0.39  0.35  0.40  0.40
0.41  *  0.40  0.43  0.41  0.39  0.37  0.42  0.38
ft other adult men  0.32  0.32  0.42  0.31  0.32  0.29  0.41  0.31
0.40*  0.41*  0.49  0.38*  0.40*  0.41*  0.41  0.39*
Dependency  ratio  2.66  2.71  2.39  2.69  1.94  2.03  2.03  1.88
2.55*  2.68  2.37  2.54*  2.01*  2.11  2.19  1.90
Resources
Real hh labor income  1054.18  959.79  1269.89  1057.89  1893.40  1815.59  1523.73  2040.87
1622.27* 1358.83* 1809.00* 1691.30*  2317.57* 2186.90* 1941.20* 2518.27*
Real non-labor  income  290.78  262.51  527.41  265.08  532.33  438.02  379.56  618.24
238.32*  259.07  204.35*  237.70  347.52*  284.35*  241.61*  415.25*
Real total hh income  2979.42  3012.92  2297.38  3079.04  3124.16  2834.70  2155.43  3561.59
3678.66*  3182.53 3027.10* 4062.36*  3831.38* 3325.96* 2825.85* 4455.46*
Hh in social security  system  0.36  0.27  0.34  0.40  0.50  0.42  0.50  0.54
0.34*  0.28  0.29  0.38  0.43*  0.33*  0.42*  0.47*
Wealth
Homeowner  0.84  0.85  0.85  0.83  0.81  0.84  0.84  0.79
0.83  0.87  0.83  0.82  0.80  0.81  0.81  0.79
Running water  0.96  0.97  0.96  0.97  0.97  0.96  0.96  0.98
0.99*  0.99*  0.97  0.99*  0.99*  0.99*  0.98*  1.00*
Rooms per capita  0.87  0.93  0.83  0.86  0.97  0.99  0.82  1.01
0.89  0.93  0.82  0.89*  1.01*  0.98  0.87  1.07*
Sample size  5335  1360  536  3439  3101  726  568  1807
4406  1146  653  2607  2735  643  582  1510
Top cell 1988 values, bottom cell 1997; those with an asterisk are significantly  different from early year at the 5% level.TABLE 2B: BRAZIL - Mean Values of Explanatory  Variable
male  female
all  s-e  Informal  Formal  all s-e  informal  Formal
Human capital
age  34.515  40.346  30.403  33.465  33.421  39.199  30.357  32.095
35.150*  39.464*  30.054  34.278*  34.523*  39.237  31.859*  33.678*
literate  0.862  0.783  0.771  0.923  0.893  0.805  0.820  0.958
0.930*  0.914*  0.882*  0.954*  0.933*  0.912*  0.878*  0.970*
Incomplete  primary 1  0.179  0.240  0.235  0.138  0.143  0.211  0.211  0.088
0.146*  0.169*  0.197*  0.119*  0.127*  0.144*  0.210  0.077*
Complete  primary 2  0.184  0.203  0.174  0.179  0.154  0.199  0.193  0.120
0.161*  0.184*  0.156*  0.149*  0.136*  0.162*  0.177*  0.102*
Incompleteprimary2  0.167  0.125  0.198  0.175  0.141  0.137  0.193  0.123
0.204*  0.169*  0.282*  0.200*  0.171*  0.176*  0.235*  0.136*
Complete  primary 2  0.083  0.058  0.056  0.101  0.079  0.082  0.056  0.087
0.104*  0.099*  0.077*  0.114*  0.086*  0.103*  0.066*  0.089
Incomplete  secondary  0.056  0.027  0.046  0.072  0.065  0.036  0.066  0.077
0.064*  0.040*  0.060*  0.079*  0.071*  0.053*  0.066  0.082
Complete secondary  0.136  0.076  0.061  0.183  0.225  0.102  0.087  0.332
0.171*  0.159*  0.088*  0.204*  0.239*  0.184*  0.093  0.338
Complete university  0.054  0.039  0.013  0.073  0.085  0.039  0.020  0.129
0.072*  0.080*  0.020*  0.084*  0.097*  0.080*  0.018  0.144*
Household  structure
Hh head  0.665  0.813  0.470  0.667  0.609  0.827  0.501  0.556
0.697*  0.813  0.485  0.696*  0.662*  0.843*  0.581*  0.618*
# children  age 1-5  0.487  0.524  0.473  0.477  0.366  0.420  0.423  0.321
0.381*  0.387*  0.372*  0.380*  0.308*  0.324*  0.367*  0.271*
# children age 6-11  0.590  0.652  0.616  0.557  0.531  0.655  0.636  0.437
0.438*  0.466*  0.410*  0.431*  0.422*  0.472*  0.491*  0.363*
# daughters  age 12-18  0.281  0.298  0.347  0.254  0.323  0.301  0.484  0.2710.244*  0.251*  0.269*  0.232*  0.293*  0.286  0.369*  0.257
#sons age 12-18  0.337  0.324  0.485  0.296  0.284  0.311  0.355  0.244
0.286*  0.271  *  0.385*  0.264*  0.250*  0.276*  0.274*  0.226*
# adult females  0.369  0.337  0.389  0.376  0.775  0.522  0.788  0.880
0.310*  0.292*  0.338*  0.311*  0.635*  0.466*  0.629*  0.717*
# adult males  0.709  0.575  0.906  0.702  0.434  0.403  0.464  0.435
0.590*  0.488*  0.773*  0.592*  0.328*  0.304*  0.343*  0.332*
Dependency  ratio  2.729  2.750  2.637  2.750  2.284  2.252  2.431  2.241
2.648*  2.582*  2.705*  2.668*  2.456*  2.320*  2.770*  2.360*
Resources
Real hhlabor income  315.30  218.28  311.26  355.49  547.46  445.176  394.597  650.058
429.52*  418.85*  415.48*  439.79*  697.62*  785.91*  456.78*  778.30*
Realnon-laborincome  128.26  120.17  114.06  135.96  190.70  174.72  122.84  223.53
110.21*  131.80*  92.27*  103.53*  130.13*  155.79  73.52*  146.83*
Real total hh income  738.77  652.96  524.87  840.35  859.29  635.33  669.41  1032.25
1056.64* 1263.03*  724.18* 1041.19*  1012.66* 1199.71*  576.36*  1157.58*
Hh in social security system  0.358  0.228  0.316  0.423  0.510  0.424  0.456  0.568
0.291*  0.218*  0.277*  0.338*  0.388*  0.338*  0.350*  0.431*
Wealth
homeowner  0.783  0.838  0.810  0.753  0.765  0.776  0.770  0.759
0.822*  0.838  0.817  0.814*  0.819*  0.839*  0.807*  0.817*
Ruining water  0.775  0.663  0.629  0.865  0.824  0.738  0.711  0.904
0.908*  0.899*  0.837*  0.935*  0.907*  0.891*  0.843*  0.946*
Rooms per capita  1.379  1.449  1.193  1.409  1.485  1.468  1.189  1.605
1.541*  1.676*  1.325*  1.531*  1.607*  1.749*  1.276*  1.708*
Race
black  0.069  0.052  0.087  0.069  0.072  0.072  0.108  0.058
0.067  0.053  0.079  0.071  0.067*  0.047*  0.095*  0.062
mulatto  0.394  0.416  0.466  0.362  0.369  0.419  0.439  0.321
0.381*  0.360*  0.467  0.366  0.367  0.368*  0.438  0.332Region
south  0.108  0.121  0.074  0.114  0.100  0.088  0.092  0.108
0.107  0.109*  0.100*  0.108  0.104  0.093  0.112*  0.105
Northeast  0.323  0.417  0.405  0.259  0.313  0.401  0.335  0.268
0.300*  0.330*  0.380*  0.259  0.313  0.391  0.322*  0.273
Samplesize  35594  8328  6511  20755  20165  4803  4246  11116
37481  11288  6118  20075  25906  6111  6645  13150
Top cell 1988  values, bottom cell 1997; those with an asterisk are significantly  different from early year at the 5% level.TABLE  2C:  COSTA RICA -Mean Values of Explanatory Variables
Male  Female
all  s-e  Informal  formal  all  s-e  informal  formal
H-man Capital
age  35.298  40.524  31.573  34.121  33.71  39.525  32.913  32.161
35.627  42.666*  31.208  34.352  34.681*  41.392  33.184  33.191
Complete  primary  0.26  0.303  0.364  0.232  0.200  0.275  0.296  0.158
0.248  0.284  0.324  0.266  0.221  0.315  0.348  0.168*
Incomplete  primary  0.137  0.216  0.188  0.104  0.099  0.192  0.194  0.051
0.116*  0.191  0.173  0.087  0.074*  0.151  0.156  0.036*
Incomplete  secondary  0.208  0.195  0.251  0.207  0.185  0.228  0.245  0.159
0.221  0.228  0.268  0.212  0.180  0.186  0.232  0.166
Complete  secondary  0.260  0.174  0.113  0.307  0.357  0.243  0.163  0.431
0.278  0.194  0.182*  0.317  0.355  0.257  0.192  0.417
Complete university  0.092  0.061  0.021  0.111  0.126  0.011  0.026  0.181
0.112*  0.074  0.015  0.139*  0.153*  0.055*  0.016*  0.210
Technical school  0.033  0.012  0.017  0.042  0.038  0.018  0.015  0.048
0.044*  0.037*  0.015  0.050  0.061*  0.029  0.024  0.078
Household Structure
Married  0.676  0.765  0.448  0.678  0.441  0.580  0.383  0.412
0.641*  0.432  0.742  0.452  0.432  0.643*  0.556  0.372
Hh head  0.676  0.801  0.448  0.667  0.618  0.819  0.577  0.567
0.658  0.792  0.479  0.648  0.649  0.839  0.560  0.617
# children age 1-5  0.506  0.559  0.410  0.502  0.374  0.355  0.408  0.373
0.380*  0.323*  0.488  0.401*  0.311*  0.299*  0.332  0.310*
# children age 6-11  0.495  0.582  0.410  0.479  0.483  0.475  0.505  0.481
0.458  0.454*  0.488  0.455  0.432  0.531  0.632  0.362
# daughters  age 12-18  0.235  0.240  0.243  0.232  0.274  0.272  0.388  0.251
0.237  0.243  0.262  0.232  0.365  0.251  0.340  0.252*
# sons age 12-18  0.253  0.244  0.301  0.250  0.214  0.192  0.250  0.2140.287*  0.272  0.363  0.279  0.248  0.312  0.296  0.220*
#adult females  0.138  0.138  0.109  0.142  0.224  0.156  0.255  0.238
0.176*  0.189  0.190*  0.171  0.261  0.228  0.340  0.253*
#adult males  0.169  0.178  0.155  0.168  0.133  0.123  0.168  0.128
0.191  0.198  0.208  0.186  0.175*  0.129  0.276  0.166*
Dependency  ratio  2.799  2.874  2.493  2.816  2.198  2.092  2.247  2.219
2.586*  2.535*  2.611  2.597  2.189  2.134*  2.304  2.179
migrant  0.048  0.044  0.063  0.047  0.044  0.029  0.087  0.040
0.055  0.046  0.048  0.058  0.054  0.032  0.080  0.055
Resources
Real hh labor income  14643.31  11772.48  17261.78  15213.96  21337.22  18379.42  20181.46 22451.41
13741.83*  13984.50  1492.36 17461.61* 23234.46*  21117.89  21281.01 24323.39
Real non-labor  income  1690.98  1333.686  1492.326  1831.999  2293.809  1897.54  1714.515 2531.963
3426.536* 4147.446*  3152.613* 3267.439* 3361.258* 3510.774* 1946.071* 3628.706
Hh in social security system  0.418  0.308  0.141  0.454  0.592  0.453  0.526  0.646
0.443  0.355  0.384  0.478  0.560  0.453  0.552  0.590
Region
San Jose  0.406  0.385  0.251  0.433  0.435  0.406  0.357  0.460
0.451*  0.456*  0.351*  0.465*  0.487*  0.469  0.472  0.494*
San Jose Metropolitan  area  0.204  0.228  0.234  0.192  0.222  0.181  0.189  0.241
0.207  0.182  0.235  0.210  0.184*  0.154  0.168  0.196
Chorotega/Brunca  0.125  0.155  0.218  0.103  0.129  0.149  0.168  0.115
0.107*  0.147  0.155  0.088  0.125  0.138  0.140  0.118*
Pacific Central  0.130  0.113  0.134  0.135  0.092  0.145  0.128  0.069
0.107*  0.113  0.122  0.103  0.087  0.122  0.084  0.078*
HuetarAtlantico/Norte  0.136  0.118  0.163  0.137  0.121  0.120  0.158  0.113
0.127  0.101  0.137  0.133  0.117  0.116  0.136  0.113
n  2604  574  234  1791  1408  276  196  936
3032  592  336  2104  1710  311  250  1149
Top cell 1989  values, bottom cell 1995; those with an asterisk are significantly  different from early year at the 5% level.TABLE 3A: ARGENTINA  -Relative risk ratios, whole samp  leA
in  fse  inf/f  se/f
1988  1997  1988  1997  1988  1997
Sex (female=l)  1.942  1.597*  2.173  1.686*  1.119  1.056
Human Resources
age  0.797  0.861*  0.809  0.892*  1.016  1.035
age  1.002 1.001*  1.003  1.001*  1.000  1.000
no school  1.839  1.168  1.311  1.220  0.713  1.044
incomplete primary  1.502  1.163  1.481  1.491*  0.987  1.282
incomplete secondary  0.703  0.904  0.648  0.767*  0.922  0.848
complete secondary  0.469  0.697*  0.26  0.337*  0.5681  0.483  *
complete university  0.195 0.264*  0.123  0.155*  0.631  0.587*
technical school  0.815  0.837  0.952  1.122  1.169  1.340
Household Structure  __
hh head  0.752  0.729  1.142  0.684  1.518  0.939
married  0.856  0.628  1.006  0.823  1.176  1.310
M  children age 1-5  1.103  0.994  1.149  1.021  1.042  1.028
M  children age 6-11  1.090  1.071  1.150  1.095  1.055  1.022
M daughters  age 12-18  0.865  1.309  1.045  1.104  1.209  0.843*
M sons age 12-18  1.511  1.119  1.329  1.141  0.879  1.020*
M adult females  1.127  1.014  1.160  0.961  . 1.029  0.947
M  adult males  1.093  0.976  1.183  1.035  1.083  1.060
Resources  I
real hh labor income  1.000  1.000*  1.00  1.000  1.000  1.000*
hh in social security system  1.075  0.945  0.599  0.661*  0.557  0.699*
dependency  ratio  0.833 0.859*  0.792  0.906*  0.951  1.054
real non-labor income  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000
Wealth
homeowner  0.982  0.842  1.099  0.990  1.119  1.175
running water  1.138  0.465  0.994  0.386  0.874  0.829
rooms per capita  0.803 0.815*  0.908  0.857  1.132  1.051
n  8157  3098
Chi 2(54)  1503.99*  715.76*
Loglikelihood  -6362.03  *  -2701.66*
Pseudo-R 2 0.11  0.12
a coefficients in bold are significantly  different from 0 in their own year, at the 5% level;
those with an asterisk are significantly  different from the coefficient in the base year, at the 5%
level.Table  3B:  BRAZIL  - Relative risk ratios, whole samplea
all  inf/se  in  f/f  se/f
1989  1995  1989  1995  1989  1995
Sex (female=1)  1.256 2.461*  1.686  2.066*  1.343 0.840*
Human  Resources  I
age  0.831 0.822*  0.846  0.853*  1.019  1.038*
age 2 1.002 1.002*  1.002  1.002*  1.000  1.000
literate  0.661 0.642*  0.486  0.543*  0.735  0.846*
primary 1 incomplete  1.075  1.133  1.272  1.210*  1.183  1.069
primary 2 incomplete  0.929  0.869  0.755  0.797*  0.813  0.917*
primary 2 complete  0.715 0.584*  0.466  0.473*  0.652  0.810*
secondary incomplete  0.848 0.611*  0.402  0.360*  0.474  0.588*
secondary complete  0.796 0.465*  0.236  0.234*  0.296  0.503*
university complete  0.746 0.407*  0.174  0.153*  0.234  0.376*
Household  structure  -
hh head  0.498 0.714*  0.662  0.760*  1.330  1.064
married  ---  0.657  0.878  1.338
# children age 1-5  0.912 0.849* 1 1.078  1.073*  1.183  1.264*
# children age 6-11  0.956 0.931*  1.067  1.069*  1.116  1.148*
#daughters age 12-18  1.106  0.971  1.117  1.044*  1.010  1.075
sons age 12-18  1.102  0.996  1.112  1.090*  1.009  1.094
# adult females  0.965  0.910  0.950  0.923*  0.985  1.014
# adult males  0.928 0.927*  1.055  1.056*  1.136  1.139*
dependency  ratio  1.018  1.065  0.910  0.949*  0.894  0.891*
Resources  I
real hh labor income  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000
hh in social security system  1.057  1.118  0.544  0.649*  0.515  0.580*
real non-labor income  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000*  1.000  1.000*
Wealth
homeowner  0.850 0.833*  0.999  0.863  1.175  1.035
water  1.018  0.931  0.603  0.728*  0.592  0.782*
Rooms per capita  0.887 0.773*  0.972  0.914  1.096  1.182*
Race  I_  I
black  1.734 1.762*  1.071  1.053  0.618  0.597*
mulatto  1.211 1.327*  0.990  1.049  0.818  0.791*
Region  I  _
south  0.672 1.127*  0.820  1.164*  1.220  1.033
northeast  0.696 0.745*  1.173  1.178*  1.685  1.581*
1989  1995
n  55759  63387
Chi2(60)  16232.03  15642.49
Loglikelihood  -46399.49  -56590.24
Pseudo-R 2 0.15  0.12
a coefficients  in bold are significantly  different from 0 in their own year, at the 5% level;
those with an asterisk  are significantly  different from the coefficient in the base year, at the 5%
level.Table  3C:  COSTA RICA - Relative Risk Ratios, whole sample
inf/se  inf/f  se/f
_____  1989 1995  1989 199S  19891995
Sex (female-l)  1.86  1.677*  1.753  1.505*  0.942  0.897
Human  Resources.
age  0.82  0.837*  0.868  0.912*  1.059  1.09*
age  1.002  1.002*  1.002  1.001*  0.999  0.999
incomplete primary  1.065  1.141  1.337  1.382  1.256  1.212
incomplete secondary  0.758  0.732  0.691  0.698*  0.911  0.952
complete secondary  0.451 0.548*  0.182  0.23*  0.404  0.42*
Household  structure
hh head  0.727  0.769  0.733  0.798  1.009  1.038
married  0.696 0.703*  0.757  0.768  1.088  1.092
# children age 1-5  0.867  0.885  1.189  1.021  1.373  1.154
# children  age 6-11  0.939  1.069  1.104  1.292  1.175  1.208*
# daughters age 12-18  1.018  1.108  1.073  1.109  1.054  1.000
#sons age 12-18  1.014  0.942  0.956  1.061  0.942  1.126
# adult females  1.07  0.949  0.957  1.038  0.894  1.094
#adult males  0.769  1.042  0.922  1.114  1.199  1.07
dependency ratio  1.025  1.152  0.831  0.943  0.811  0.819*
Resources  I_  _  _
real hh labor income  1.00  0.999  1.000  1.000  0.999  1.000
hh in social security system  1.183  1.167  0.553  0.637*  0.468  0.546*
real non-labor  income  1.00  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999  1.000
Region
San Jose Metropolitan area  1.256  1.3371 1.438  1.14  1.144  0.852
Chorotega/Brunca  1.869  1.150  2.552  1.587*  1.365  1.38*
Pacific Central  1.638  1.068  1.553  1.052  0.947  0.985
Huetar Atlantico/Norte  r5  1.803  1.484*  1.637  1.121  0.907  0.756
1989  1995
n  4012  4742
Chi(48)  981.6  1144.28
Loglikelihood  -2847.54  -3376.74
Pseudo-R  0.147  0.145
a coefficients in bold are significantly  different from 0 in their own year, at the 5% level;
those with an asterisk are significantly  different from the coefficient in the base year, at the 5%
level.Table 4A:  ARGENTINA  - relative  risk ratios by gendera
women  men
Inf/se  inf/f  se/f  Inf/se  inf/f  se/f
1988  1997  1988  1997  1988  1997  1988  1997  1988  1997  1988  1997
Human capital  I  _  l
age  0.860+ 0.886+* 0.832+ 0.934+*  0.968  1.054  0.742+  0.832+  0.776+ 0.863+*  1.045  1.037
age 2 1.002+ 1.001+*  1.002  1.001+  1.001  1.000  1.003+ 1.002+*  1.003+ 1.002+*  1.000  1.000
no school  1.882  2.243  1.917  1.257  1.018  0.560  1.607  0.672*  0.796  0.915  0.495  1.361
incomplete  primary  1.685+  1.343  2.746+ 3.021  +*  1.630k 2.249+*  1.273  0.968  1.037  1.064  0.814  1.099
incomplete  secondary  0.918  0.831  0.477+  0.670*  0.519k  0.806  0.675+  1.027  0.806  0.851  1.193  0.828
complete secondary  0.582+ 0.653+* 0.128+ 0.244+*  0.220  0.374+*  0.579+  0.850  0.525+ 0.442+*  0.907  0.520+
complete university  0.304+ 0.290+* 0.088+ 0.095+*  0.288+ 0.329+*  0.174+ 0.308+*  0.173+ 0.283+*  0.995  0.917
technical school  1.054  1.742  0.893  1.573  0.847  0.903  0.721  0.678+  0.765  0.983  1.060  1.450+*
Household Structure
hh head  0.750  0.510k  1.133  0.850  1.510k 1.668+*  0.572+  0.850  0.963  0.549+  1.684+ 0.646*+
Married  0.744+ 0.658+*  1.224  0.966  1.646k 1.468+*  1.129  0.613+  0.969  0.797  0.859  1.300
# children age 1-5  0.986  0.934  1.056  1.054  1.072  1.128  1.282+  0.981  1.323+  1.028  1.032  1.047
#children age 6-11  1.282+  1.081  1.338+  1.194  1.043  1.104  0.999  1.077  1.053  1.069  1.054  0.992
# daughters  age 12-18  0.950  0.897  1.196  0.895  1.259k  0.998  0.754+ 1.744+*  0.854  1.249+  1.132  0.716+
# sons age 12-18  1.402+  1.052  1.382+ 1.285+*  0.985  1.222  1.658+  1.143  1.385k  1.056  0.835+  0.923
# adult females  1.130  1.023  1.042  0.882  0.922  0.862  1.146  1.037  1.224k  0.984  1.068  0.949
#adult males  1.253+  0.844  1.220+  0.900  0.974  1.066  1.074  1.058  1.219+  1.130  1.135+  1.068
Dependency  ratio  0.796+  0.978  0.863  1.091  1.084  1.115  0.832+ 0.777+*  0.801+ 0.853+*  0.963  1.097+
Resources
real hh labor income  1.000+  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000+ 1.000+*  1.000+  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000+  1.000
hh in social security system  1.284  1.505  0.679+  0.879  0.529+ 0.584+*  0.844  0.629+  0.440+ 0.490+* 0.522+ 0.779+*
real non-labor  income  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000+  1.000  1.000+  1.000  1.000  1.000
Wealth
Homeowner  0.996  1.031  1.321  1.122  1.327+  1.088  0.897  0.696+  0.973  0.868  1.085  1.247
running water  1.294  0.819  0.883  0.469  0.682  0.572  1.015  0.323k  0.951  0.315+  0.938  0.975
rooms per capita  0.781  0.909  0.830  0.836  1.062  0.920  0.864  0.726+  1.009  0.870  1.168  1.199+1988  1997  1988  1997
Sample size  3010  1203  5075  1895
LR statistic  976.81+  313.78+  656.04+  466.67k
Chi-2  -2382.91+  -1659.53k  -3850.41+  -993.79+
Pseudo-RW  0.17  0.079  0.19  0.086
aCoefficients  with a cross (+) are significantly different from 0 (at ihe 5%0  le-vcl)  in their own year. Those with an asterisk are significantly  different from the base
year.Table 4B: BRAZIL - relative risk ratios by gendera
women  men
.if7se  isf/se  __se/
1989  1995  1989  1995  1989  1995  1989  1995  1989  1995  1989  1995
Human capital  _
age  0.845+ 0.857+* 0.850+ 0.873+*  1.006  1.019  0.824+ 0.800+*  0.849+ 0.839+*  1.030+ 1.048+*
age2 1.002+ 1.001+* 1.002+ 1.002+*  1.000  1.000  1.002+ 1.002+*  1.002+ 1.002+*  1.000  1.000
black  1.735+ 2.129+* 1.345+ 1.186+*  0.775+  0.557+*  1.699+ 1.489+*  0.921  0.925  0.542+ 0.621+*
mulatto  1.233+ 1.362+* 1.083  1.068  0.878+  0.784+*  1.185+ 1.294+*  0.931+  1.035  0.785+ 0.800+*
literate  0.731+ 0.614+* 0.435+ 0.495+*  0.595+  0.805+*  0.634+ 0.674+*  0.510+ 0.577+* 0.805+ 0.857+*
primary 1 incomplete  1.021  1.227+ 1.234+ 1.296+*  1.209+  1.056  1.108  1.059  1.293+ 1.  142+* 1.167+  1.079
primary  2 incomplete  0.781+ 0.662+* 0.695+ 0.711+*  0.890  1.074  1.029  1.052  0.795+ 0.887+* 0.772+ 0.844+*
primary 2 complete  0.503+ 0.430+* 0.382+ 0.381  +*  0.760+  0.887*  0.907  0.757+*  0.539k 0.586+* 0.595+ 0.774+*
secondary  incomplete  0.773+ 0.418+* 0.376+ 0.303+*  0.486+  0.726+*  0.898  0.832+*  0.422k 0.436+* 0.470+ 0.523+*
secondary  complete  0.797+ 0.413+* 0.172+ 0.156+*  0.216+  0.377+*  0.854+ 0.638+*  0.330+ 0.389+* 0.387+ 0.610+*
university complete  0.923  0.395+ 0.135+ 0.094+*  0.147+  0.239+*  0.722+ 0.550+*  0.2364 0.275+* 0.327+ 0.500+*
Household structure  I
hh head  0.488+ 0.608+* 0.937  0.871  1.920+  1.432+*  0.509+ 0.689+*  0.497d 0.617+*  0.976  0.895
married  ---  0.624+1  1.004  1.609+  ---  0.660+  --  0.765+  ___  1.160+
# children age 1-5  0.871+ 0.802+* 1.075+  1.057  1.234+  1.317+*  0.937+ 0.899+*  1.118+ 1.145+* 1.193+ 1.274+*
# children age 6-11  0.927+ 0.923+* 1.113+ 1.088+*  1.200+  1.178+*  0.971  0.929+  1.049k 1.050+* 1.080+ 1.130+*
# daughters  age 12-18  1.203+  0.980 1.138+  1.027  0.946  1.048  1.054  0.972  1.106+  1.054  1.050  1.085+*
# sons age 12-18  1.070  0.936  1.045  1.028  0.977  1.098+  1.110+  1.022  1.136k 1.110+  1.023  1.086+
# adult females  0.996  0.867+ 0.970  0.937+  0.974  1.081+  0.949  0.965  1.035  1.043  1.092+ 1.081  +*
# adult males  0.950  1.000  1.014  1.035  1.068+  1.034  0.920+ 0.890+*  1.025  0.982  1.114+ 1.104+*
dependency  ratio  1.011  1.027 0.950+ 0.963+*  0.940+  0.938+*  1.013  1.075+  0.886J 0.938+* 0.875+ 0.872+*
Resources  5.937+  5.453+*
real hh labor income  1.000k 1.000+* 1.000  1.000  1.000+  1.000  +*  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000+
hh in social security system  1.016  1.045 0.649+ 0.679+*  0.638+  0.650+*  1.091  1.121+  0.4521 0.570+* 0.415+ 0.509+*
real non-labor  income  1.000  1.000 1.000+  1.000  1.000+  1.000+*  1.000  1.000  1.000+  1.000  1.000+ 1.000+*Wealth  I
homeowner  0.944  0.862+ 0.958  0.871+  1.015  1.010  0.800+ 0.814+*  1.026  0.852+  1.283+  1.047
water  0.998  0.932 0.718+ 0.813+*  0.720w  0.872+*  1.011  0.872+  0.544+ 0.662+* 0.538+ 0.759+*
Rooms per capita  0.887+ 0.716+* 0.904+ 0.841+*  1.020  1.175+  0.885+ 0.832+*  1.019  0.988  1.152+ 1.187+*
Region  I  I  I  I
south  0.925~  i.2i9+j  0.9i1  1.165+  09  _  0.956  0.559+  1.074  0.752+  1.152  1.346+  1.073
northeast  0.649+1  0.547+*J 1.034  1.0461 1.592+1 1.913+*|  0.723+1  0.9541  1.260+ 1.365  *  1.743  1.43i *
1989  1995  1989  1995
Sample size  20165  25906  35594  37481
F-statistic  7540.37+  8732.37+  9396.31+  6993.31+
LR statistic  -16356.14+  -22418.09+  -29653.88+  -33673.49+
Pseudo-R'  0.19  0.14  0.16  0.094
aCoefficients  with a cross (+) are significantly  different from 0 (at the 5% level) in their own year. Those with an asterisk are significantly  different from the base
year.Table 4C:  COSTA  RICA - relative risk ratios by gender
women  men
inf/se  inf/se  inf/f  inf/f  se/f  se/f  inf/se  Inf/se  inf/f  inf/f  se/f  se/f
1989  1995  1989  1995  1989  1995  1989  1995  1989  1995  1989  1995
Human Capital
Age  0.916  0.919  0.883+  0.881+  0.964  0.959  0.769+ 0.799+*  0.835+ 0.895+*  1.086+  1.12+*
Age 2 1.000  1.000  1.002+ 1.001+*  1.001  1.001  1.003+ 1.002+*  1.003  1.001+  0.999  0.999 
Incomplete primary  1.084  1.278  1.683  1.575  1.553  1.233  1.017  1.072  1.26  1.351  1.239  1.26
Incomplete secondary  0.708  0.858  0.695  0.593k  0.981  0.691  0.819  0.71  0.72  0.77  0.878  1.084
Complete secondary  0.559+  0.549+* 0.145k 0.169+*  0.259+  0.307+*  0.466+ 0.618+*  0.228k 0.305+* 0.489+  0.494+*
Household  Structure  I
hh head  0.831  0.557  0.947  0.656  1.14  1.178  0.456+  0.881  0.473i  0.961  1.038  1.094
Married  0.614  0.708  1.202  1.092  1.958k  1.542+*  0.973  0.639  0.743  0.517+  0.763  0.809
# children age 1-5  0.978  0.891  1.173  1.018  1.199  1.143  0.839  0.875  1.226  ---  1.461+  1.143
# children age 6-11  1.111  1.203  0.969  1.86k  0.872  1.546+  0.877  0.98  1.135  1.07  1.295  1.092
#daughters age 12-18  1.148  1.292  1.26  1.164  1.097  0.9  0.887  1.017  0.915  1.064  1.032  1.047
# sons age 12-18  1.096  0.907  0.881  1.201  0.804  1.323+  0.936  0.936  0.918  0.987  0.982  1.055
# adult fernales  1.322  0.802  1.037  1.043  0.784  1.3  0.801  0.936  0.85  1.007  1.062  1.047
# adult  males  1.086  2.061k  1.061  1.491  0.976  0.724  0.633+  0.785  0.751  0.94  1.187  1.198
Dependency  ratio  1.081  1.04  0.899  0.865  0.832  0.832  1.034  1.21+  0.851k  1.02  0.823+  0.843+*
Resources  II_
real hh labor income  1.000  0.999  1.000  0.999  0.999  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  1.000  0.999  0.999
hh in social security system  1.402  1.408  0.513+  0.774  0.366k  0.55+*  1.064  0.981  0.528k 0.519+* 0.496+  0.529+*
real non-labor income  1.000  0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999  1.000  1.000  0.999  0.999  1.000  0.999  1.000
Region  I
San Jose Metropolitan  area  1.116  0.998  1.143  0.828  1.024  0.83  1.493  1.648+  1.825i  1.394+*  1.222  0.846
Chorotega/Brunca  1.453  1.063  1.993k  1.212  1.371  1.14  2.288+  1.311  3.123k  2.0+*  1.365  1.525+
Pacific Central  1.018  0.847k 2.402k  1.013  2.359+  1.196  2.035+  1.312  1.437  1.186  0.706+  0.904
Huetar Atlantico/Norte rS  1.485  1.23  1.801k  1.389  1.213  1.129  2.01k+  1.718+*  1.652k  1.069  0.822  0.622+
1989  1995  1989  1995
Sample size  1408  1710  2604  3032Chi-2  546.12k  669.77k  514.86  +  573.35+
Loglikelihood  -945.34k  -1  132.7e  ~  -1851.69k  -2188.25k
pseudo-R2  0.224  0.228  0.122  0.116
'Coefficients  with  a cross  (+)  are significantly  different  from 0 (at  the 5%  level)  in their  own  year. Those  with  an asterisk  are significantly  different  from  the base
year.TABLE 5: Conditional sectoral attachment  probabilitiesa
Panel A: Argentina
1988  means and parameters  1997  means and parameters
all  male  female  all  Male  female
s-e  0.244  0.249  0.236  0.24  0.247  0.229
informal wage  0.133  0.102  0.185  0.175*  0.151*  0.214*
formal  0.623  0.649  0.579  0.585*  0.602*  0.557*
1997  means and 1988  parameters  1988  means and 1997 parameters
s-e  0.241  0.248  0.229  0.252  0.253*  0.251
informal wage  0.128  0.107  0.163*  0.169*  0.139*  0.215*
formal  0.631  0.649  0.607*  0.579*  0.607*  0.533*
Panel B: Brazil
1989  means and parameters  1995 means and parameters
all  male  female  All  Male  female
s-e  0.235  0.234  0.238  0.241*  0.259*  0.217
informal wage  0.193  0.183  0.211  0.211*  0.173*  0.263*
formal  0.572  0.583  0.551  0.548*  0.568*  0.52*
1997 means and 1988 parameters  1988  means and 1997  parameters
s-e  0.231  0.222*  0.248*  0.243*  0.265*  0.202*
informal wage  0.166*  0.159*  0.186*  0.232*  0.198*  0.288*
formal  0.603*  0.62*  0.566*  0.526*  0.537*  0.51*
Panel C: Costa Rica
1989  means and parameters  1995  means and parameters
all  male  female  All  Male  Female
s-e  0.211  0.22  0.196  0.19*  0.195*  0.182*
informal wage  0.108  0.092  0.139  0.124*  0.092*  0.146
formal  0.68  0.688  0.667  0.686  0.694  0.672
1997 means and 1988  parameters  1988 means and 1997 parameters
s-e  0.207  0.214  0.194  0.187*  0.193*  0.178
informal wage  0.102  0.088  0.129  0.13*  0.116*  0.159
formal  0.691  0.698  0.677  0.68  0.691  0.662
a sample sizes, standard  errors are in Appendix 1. An asterisk indicates that the coefficient is
significantly  different from the 1989(88)  means and parameters  proportions.IX.  References
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(Marginal effects)
ALL  Argentina  Brazil  Costa Rica
1988  1997  1989  1995  1989  1995
Sex  -0.46*  -0.39*  -0.48*  -0.39*  -0.45*  -0.43*
(0.0077)  (0.0089)  (0.0029)  (0.0031)  (0.011)  (0.0097)
Household  head  0.06*  0.019  -0.041*  0.14*  0.12*  0.14*
(0.018)  (0.019)  (0.0057)  (0.0068)  (0.024)  (0.022)
Couple  -0.15*  -0.1  *  ---  -0.12*  -0.16*  -0.16*
(0.014)  (0.015)  (0.0052)  (0.018)  (0016)
Age  0.084*  0.085*  0.049*  0.054*  0.067*  0.057*
(0.0024)  (0.0025)  (0.00094)  (0.00089)  (0.003)  (0.0025)
Age  -0.001*  -0.001I  *  -0.00065*  -0.00072*  -0.00087*  -0.00075*
(0.000031)  (0.000032)  (0.000013)  (0.000012)  (0.000036)  (0.00003)
black  ---  0.078*  0.037*  ----  ---
(0.0067)  (0.0066)
mulatto  ---  0.036*  0.024*  ---  ---
(0.0039)  (0.024)
Primary  (I) incomplete  0.015  -0.042*  -0.028*  -0.023*  0.028  -0.038*
(0.013)  (0.018)  (0.0054)  (0.0055)  (0.019)  (0.019)
Primary (2) incomplete  ---  ---  -0.0074  0.0025  ---  ---
(0.0059)  (0.0054)
Primaiy (2) complete  ---  0.052*  0.059*  ---  ---
(0.0071)  (0.0065)
Secondary  incomplete  0.017  -0.038*  -0.032*  0.015*  0.017  -0.047*
(0.013)  (0.015)  (0.0081)  (0.0073)  (0.018)  (0.016)
Secondary  complete  0.1  1*  0.1  1*  0.16*  0.15*  0.098*  0.089*
(0.012)  (0.014)  (0.0053)  (0.0052)  (0.016)  (0.014)
University  complete  0.35*  0.32*  0.3*  0.3*  ---  ---
(0.012)  (0.014)  (0.0045)  (0.0052)
Technical school  0.018  0.037  ------  ---  ---(0.017)  (0.019)
Children age 1-5  -0.051  *  -0.028*  -0.033*  -0.026*  -0.0086  0.0059
(0.0088)  (0.011)  (0.0027)  (0.003)  (0.0099)  (0.01)
Children age 6-12  -0.03*  -0.025*  -0.0085*  -0.0059*  -0.0048  -0.0089
(0.0068)  (0.0081)  (0.0023)  (0.0025)  (0.0089)  (0.0083)
Daughters age 13-18  0.00054  0.00079  0.018*  0.016*  -0.0013  -0.0049
(0.0097)  (0.011)  (0.029)  (0.016)  (0.012)  (0.011)
Sons age 13-18  -0.03*  -0.044*  -0.022*  -0.026*  -0.057*  -0.053*
(0.0093)  (0.0095)  (0.0028)  (000)  (0.012)  (0.0096)
Females age 18+  0.0084  0.022*  0.04*  0.085*  0.037*  0.029*
(0.0071)  (0.0077)  (0.0024)  (0.0026)  (0.014)  (0.012)
Males age 18+  0.0032  0.0097  -0.028*  -0.026*  0.011  0.0049
(0.0075)  (0.0077)  (0.0022)  (0.0024)  (0.014)  (0.014)
Real hh labor income  -0.000022*  -0.000019*  -0.000011  *  -0.000027*  -l.Ox1o-
6 *  -5.35xl 0-7*
(2.1  1x106)  (1.82x10- 6)  (6.0x10- 7)  (1.73x10- 6)  (2.16x10- 7)  (6.51x10- 8)
Real hh non-labor income  -9.27xl o- 6*  -0.000081  *  -0.000025*  -0.00012*  -7.65xl0 6*  -1.0xlO-6*
(12.32x10- 6)  (5.07x10-6)  (8.33x10- 7 (3.98x10-6)  (7.24x10- 7)  (1.09x10- 7)
Own home  -0.1  -0.079*  -0.059*  -0.044*  ---  ---
(0.012)  (0.014)  (0.0043)  (0.0045)
Water  0.0068  -0.072  -0.011  *  0.0082  ---  ---
(0.025)  (0.048)  (0.0049)  (0.0057)
Rooms per capita  0.0069  0.045*  -0.0042  -0.0075*  ---  ---
(0.011)  (0.012)  (0.0024)  (0.0023)
South  ---  ---  -0.015*  0.037*  ---  ---
(0.0059)  (0.0056)
Northeast  ---  ---  -0.054*  -0.04*
(0.0043)  (0.004)
r2  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.041  -0.034*
(0.017)  (0.015)
r3  ----  ---  ---  0.0005  -0.04*
(0.019)  (0.019)
r4  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.025  -0.045*(0.021)  (0.02)
r5  ---  -0.043*  -0.066*
(0.02)  (0.019)
Sample size  17039  13813  96185  108280  7458  8844
LR statistic  6181.19  4926*  31863*  29971*  2416*  2869*
Pseudo-R 2 0.26  0.26  0.25  0.2  0.24  0.25
MEN  Argentina  Brazil  Costa Rica
1988  1997  1989  1995  1989  1995
Household head  0.063*  0.04  0.14*  0.16*  0.11*  0.064*
(0.023)  (0.025)  (0.0069)  (0.0095)  (0.02)  (0.021)
Couple  0.1*  0.091*  ---  0.089*  0.051*  0.068*
(0.02)  (0.022)  (0.0079)  (0.021)  (0.018)
Age  0.066*  0.076*  0.025*  0.032*  0.039*  0.031  *
(0.0027)  (0.0029)  (0.00079)  (0.00096)  (0.0027)  (0.0021)
Age 2 -0.0089*  -0.00096*  -0.00035*  -0.00046*  -0.00051"*  -0.00041*
(0.00034)  (0.00038)  (0.00001)  (0.000013)  (0.000032)  (0.000025)
Black  ---  ---  0.0021  0.0015  ---  ---
(0.0064)  (0.0075)
Mulatto  ---  ---  0.0082*  0.0056  ---  ---
(0.0036)  (0.0055)
Primary (1) incomplete  0.0053  -0.074*  -0.1*  -0.014*  -0.0041  -0.002
(0.016)  (0.025)  (0.005)  (0.0063)  (0.017)  (0.015)
Primary (2) incomplete  ---  ---  -0.018*  -0.0035  ---  ---
(0.0056)  (0.0062)
Primary (2) complete  ---  ---  0.019*  0.039*  ---  ---
(0.0063)  (0.0071)
Secondary  incomplete  0.0071  -0.031  -0.072*  -0.04*  -0.014  -0.04*
(0.015)  (0.018)  (0.0087)  (0.0089)  (0.016)  (0.015)
Secondary  complete  0.034*  0.068*  0.018*  0.053*  -0.046*  -0.023
(0.14)  (0.016)  (0.0055)  (0.0061)  (0.015)  (0.013)University  complete  0.16*  0.15*  0.094*  0.13*  ---  ---
(0.015)  (0.018)  (0.0044)  (0.006)
Technical school  0.027  0.027  ---  ---  ---  ---
(0.016)  (0.018)
Children age 1-5  0.0016  0.017  0.015*  0.012*  0.023*  0.035*
(0.011)  (0.014)  (0.0028)  (0.0038)  (0.01)  (0.01)
Children age 6-12  0.0074  0.011  -0.0018  0.0079*  0.0027  0.013
(0.0086)  (0.011)  (0.0021)  (0.0031)  (0.0087)  (0.0075)
Daughters  age 13-18  -0.0091  0.00082  -0.0016  0.0016  -0.0074  -0.012
(0.012)  (0.013)  (0.0027)  (0.0036)  (0.01)  (0.0087)
Sons age 13-18  -0.014  -0.019  -0.015*  -0.015*  -0.023*  -0.018*
(0.011)  (0.011)  (0.0024)  (0.0032)  (0.0091)  (0.0071)
Females age 18+  0.0043  0.02*  -0.0059*  0.01*  0.021  0.0038
(0.008)  (0.0093)  (0.0021)  (0.0029)  (0.013)  (0.0094)
Males age 18+  0.026*  0.017  0.0069*  0.019*  0.0044  0.0068
(0.0086)  (0.0092)  (0.0019)  (0.0026)  (0.0097)  (0.0097)
Real hh labor income  -7.96xlO-*  -7.25x10-6*  -1.82xl  0-
6 *  -2.75xlO6  -1.51x10- 7 -1.59x10- 7*
(2.93xlO6)  (2.32x10-6)  (4.87xlO- 7)  (2.07x10-6)  (1.52x10- 7)  (4.98x10- 8)
Real hh non-labor income  -0.000013*  -0.00075*  -0.000013*  -0.0001  *  -3.68x10-6*  -3.74xl  0-7*
(2.57xlO6)  (5.82x10-6)  (6.08x1  07)  (4.07x  1  0-6)  (4.89xlO-7)  (6.36x10-8)
Own home  -0.046*  -0.013  -0.02*  -0.029*  ---
(0.014)  (0.017)  (0.0039)  (0.0051)
Water  0.039  -0.13*  -0.0091*  0.017*  ---  ---
(0.031)  (0.041)  (0.0042)  (0.0069)
Rooms per capita  0.021  0.045*  -0.0086*  0.01*  ---  ---
(0.013)  (0.016)  (0.0021)  (0.0027)
South  ---  ---  -0.0036  0.024*  ---  ---
(0.0054)  (0.0063)
Northeast  ---  ---  -0.038*  -0.032*  ---  ---
(0.0041)  (0.0047)
r2  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.034*  0.015
(0.015)  (0.011)r3  ---  ---  -0.0039  -0.0073
(0.016)  (0.015)
r4  ---  ---  ---  ---  0.0081  0.0064
(0.016)  (0.014)
r5  ---  ---  ---  ---  -0.017  -0.015
(.0-18  (0.015)
Sample size  7699  6585  45396  49105  3536  4220
LR statistic  2256*  2436*  7976*  10967*  1011*  1078*
Pseudo-R 2 0.25  0.31  0.2  0.2  0.31  0.29
WOMEN  Argentina  Brazil  Costa Rica
1988  1997  1989  1995  1989  1995
Household head  0.06*  0.0099  -0.14*  0.0777*  0.1*  0.18*
(0.019)  (0.023)  (0.0078)  (0.0084)  (0.03)  (0.028)
Couple  -0.29*  -0.22*  ---  -0.23*  -0.35*  -0.35*
(0.017)  (0.018)  (0.0064)  (0.022)  (0.021)
Age  0.064*  0.066*  0.045*  0.056*  0.064*  0.057*
(0.0029)  (0.0032)  (0.013)  (0.0013)  (0.0044)  (0.0038)
Age 2 -0.00085  *  -0.00083*  -0.0006*  -0.00075*  -0.00088*  -0.00081  *
(0.00038)  (0.000041)  (0.000019)  (0.000018)  (0.000055)  (0.000047)
Black  ---  ---  0.14*  0.063*
(0.01)  (0.0093)
Mulatto  ---  ---  0.049*  0.033*  ---  ---
(0.0054)  (0.0051)
Primary (1) incomplete  0.034*  -0.0089  -0.035*  -0.024*  -0.049  -0.062*
(0.017)  (0.023)  (0.0071)  (0.0072)  (0.027)  (0.027)
Primary (2) incomplete  ---  ---  0.0086  -0.00095  ---  ---
(0.008)  (0.0073)
Primary  (2) complete  ---  ---  0.063*  0.055*  ---  ---
(0.01)  (0.0092)
Secondary  incomplete  0.0099*  -0.031  0.021  0.033*  0.014  -0.048*(0.016)  (0.019)  (0.011)  (0.01)  (0.025)  (0.023)
Secondary  complete  0.12*  0.097*  0.24*  0.19*  0.19*  0.15*
(0.016)  (0.018)  (0.0082)  (0.0076)  (0.022)  (0.02)
University  complete  0.43*  0.39*  0.47*  0.4  1*
(0.022)  (0.022)  (0.0091)  (0.0087)
Technical school  0.045  0.064  ---  ---  ---  ---
(0.033)  (0.044)
Children age 1-5  -0.097*  -0.078*  -0.073*  -0.064*  -0.046*  -0.033*
(0.011)  (0.014)  (0.0036)  (0.0039)  (0.013)  (0.014)
Children  age 6-12  -0.054*  -0.052*  -0.0096*  -0.014*  -0.0044  -0.031*
(0.008)  (0.01)  (0.003)  (0.0033)  (0.012)  (0.012)
Daughters age 13-18  0.007  0.007  0.015*  0.0059  -0.02  -0.03*
(0.011)  (0.014)  (0.0038)  (0.0038)  (0.015)  (0.015)
Sons age 13-18  -0.036*  -0.049*  0.0046  -0.0053  -0.029  -0.041*
(0.011)  (0.013)  (0.0041)  (0.0042)  (0.017)  (0.015)
Females  age 18+  -0.0028  0.0053  0.029*  0.015*  0.0042  0.015
(0.0085)  (0.0099)  (0.0032)  (0.0035)  (0.018)  (0.017)
Males age 18+  -0..023*  -0.0051  -0.014*  -0.0099*  0.039  0.019
(0.009)  (0.0098)  (0.0033)  (0.0036)  (0.022)  (0.02)
Real hh labor income  -0.000012*  -0.000014*  -0.000015*  -0.000025*  -6.2x10- 7*  -3.52x10- 7*
(2.24x  1  0-6)  (2.2x10-6)  (8.82x10- 7)  (2.22x  10-6)  (3.15x1  0-7)  (9.03x10-8)
Real hh non-labor  income  -3.88x104  -0.000062  -0.000018*  -0.000099*  -6.76xlo-6*  _9.9Xl0-
7*
(2.84x  10-6)  (6.46x  10-6)  (1.27xl104)  (5.67x  10-6)  (I. 14x10O-6) (1.96x1  0-7)
Own home  -0.1*  -0.1  *  -0.072*  -0.044*  ---  ---
(0.016)  (0.018)  (0.0059)  (0.006)
Water  -0.0071  0.011  -0.0022  -0.0045  ---  ---
(0.031)  (0.063)  (0.0066)  (0.0075)
Rooms  per capita  0.0013  0.037*  0.0029  -0.012*  ---  ---
(0.012)  (0.014)  (0.0032)  (0.0029)
South  ---  ---  -0.019*  0.04*
(0.0077)  (0.00756)
Northeast  ---  ---  -0.048*  -0.041  ---  ---(0.0055)  (0.0052)
---  ---  ---  ---  -0.025  -0.085*
(0.022)  (0.02)




---  --  --- -0.051  -0.095*
(0.027)  (0.025)
Sanple size  9340  7228  50789  59175  3922  4624
LR statistic  2136*  1663*  8164*  10770*  803*  954*
Pseudo-R 2 0.18  0.17  0.12  0.13  0.15  0.15Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
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